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WRIGHT PATMAN AND THE IMPEACHMENT
OF ANDREW MELLON
by Janet Schmelzer

Impeachment of a public official, especially a nationally recngnized
figure, has not been a common occurrence in American politics. Since
1789 Congress has impeached only thirteen federal officials, and acting
on only twelve cases, the Senate has voted six acquittals, two dismissals,
and only four convictions.
1

In the first impeachment from 1797 to 1799 the House of Representatives charged Tennessee Senator William Blount with influencing
Cherokees to aid the British against Louisiana and Spanish Florida;
the Senate, which had already expelled him eighteen months before,
dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. In 1805 in Thomas Jefferson's administration the House charged Supreme Court Justice Samuel
Chase with malfeasance and misfeasance; but he was acquitted. Sixtythree years later Radical Republicans, waving weak evidence and
trumped-up charges, claimed that Andrew Johnson had committed
"high Crimes and Misdemeanors" by violating the laws of Congress;
he, too, was acquitted. And during the Ulysses S. Grant administration,
the Senate tried Secretary of War William W. Belknap for accepting
bribes, but acquitted him as well.'

On several occasions, however, abortive impeachments have
occurred. These cases, where impeachment resolutions failed in the
House, included John Tyler (1843), Vice President Schuyler Colfax
(1873), Attorney General Harry Daugherty (1923), Herbert Hoover
(1932 and 1933), and Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas
(1970).' In the twentieth century two other investigations into possible
impeachment proceedings have had dramatic effects on the national
government. One, of course, centered on Richard M. Nixon. Actual
criminal activities on his part in the Watergate scandal were never confirmed by a Senate trial or by a House vote to impeach. Vet the constitutional process of removal was imminent and was stymied only by
his resignation.

The other case, that of Secretary of the Treasury Andrew W.
Mellon, failed to draw the audience or generate the fear caused by
Watergate, but the investigation dramatized the changing political and
economic atmosphere of 1932. More specifically, this impeachment
attempt dueled two opposing philosophies. At one end of the spectrum
was Mellon, the defendant, who epitomized the Conservative Republicanism of the 1920s; at the other end was Congressman Wright Patman
of Texas, the prosecutor, who followed Democratic beliefs of governJanet Schmelzer teaches at Tarleton State University, Stephenville.

34

EAST TEXAS HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION

mental responsibility for the general welfare. Since the key antagonists
were Mellon and Patman, the entire affair reflected the conflict between
conservative economics and populist-progressive ideas.
Herbert Hoover assumed the Presidency in 1929, three years before
the impeachment attempt. Since helping to formulate economic policy
as Secretary of Commerce during the Warren G. Harding and Calvin
Coolidge administrations, he maintained the prevailing governmental
attitude toward business, banking, farming, and spending. He even
carried over Secretary of the Treasury Mellon, not necessarily for the
ideological continuity but for the Republican following which he
commanded. '
The Hoover Administration continued to direct the nation as its
predecessors had since 1921. But this relatively calm state quickly
changed in October, 1929. With the advent of the Great Crash and
the spiraling depression Hoover encountered bitter conflict and unsatisfactory solutions. He stubbornly applied principles that were outdated.
Believing in self-reliance and self-respect, he could not balance laissezfaire and a socialized economy. If federal tinkering handicapped free
enterprise, the government withdrew controls. When the unemployed,
the starving, and the homeless sought aid, he thrust this chore on state
and local authorities which were bankrupt. Under no circumstance
would he approve a "handout" or "dole," believing that to do so
destroyed American independent spirit and ambition or "rugged individualism," as he called it. cAs the leader of the nation, Hoover soon discovered that the application of his personal philosophy to government produced problems.
He expeeted deferenee from congressional leaders, who openly refused;
more often than not he received little cooperation from either the House
or Senate. Only on rare occasions did he score significant legislature
victories-the Agricultural Marketing Act in 1929 and the Reconstruction Finance Corporation Act in 1932. At the same time he would
undo congressional programs by rejecting across-the-board aid programs, by depending upon "voluntary cooperation," and by hanging onto
the antiquated "'trickle down" theory. And much to the chagrin of

legislators he either would not or could not recognize the severity of
tbe depression.'
Of the many congressmen who criticized the Hoover Administration and its misguided attitude toward public relief and economic policy,
Wright Patman, a freshman in the House elected in 1928, was particularly vocaL A staunch Democrat, he disliked Hoover and had "no real
use for Republicans." As far as he was concerned, the executive branch
could not cope with national crisis; Congress should, therefore, fill the
vacuum.
7
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Patman was not an irresponsible troublemaker. Always calling
himself the representative of the "common people," he felt he knew
what they needed. A native of rural East Texas, the son of a tenant
farmer, he saw how inflexible credit and tight money hurt agriculture.
Throughout his political career, he worked in the behalf of small businessmen, laborers, farmers, and veterans and against "big business,"
"greedy banks," and "special interests." In so doing he was at odds

with Mellon, who, Patman believed, worked against the common good
and symbolized the ills of government.'

In 1932 Mellon was seventy-six-years old. Frail in appearance,
thin in physique, with silver hair and cold blue-grey eyes, he possessed
an air of distinction. To many he was the epitome of money, power,
and success. Born in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, he grew up in an affluent environment. After his father, Thomas Mellon, established the
banking house of T. Mellon and Sons in 1869, he joined it as a partner
in 1874 and within six years, upon his father's retirement, became sale
owner. Since Pittsburgh was booming, he used every financial opportnnity to build Aluminum Company of America (ALCOA), Gulf Oil
Corporation, Union Steel Company, Standard Steel Car Company, and
New York Shipbuilding Company. He even helped organize the Union
Trust Company of Pittsburgh in 1889 and incorporated T. Mellon and
Sons into MeIlon National Bank in 1902, becoming president of both
firms. His reputation as an outstanding financier was fully merited.
By 1910 MeIlon was an important figure in state Republican
politics, contributing heavily to party candidates. Known as a fiscal
conservative who espoused high tariffs, he became Secretary of the
Treasury in the Harding Administration in 1921, then served in the
same Cabinet position under Coolidge and Hoover. A powerful influence in national affairs, he helped to defeat "bonus" bills and agricultural legislation which, in turn, earned him the hatred of veterans and
farmers. Recognized as one of the nation'8 most prominent economic
leaders and richest men, second only to John D. Rockefeller, he was
highly respected by the financial community. He was also known for
tax reform and tight fiscal policies which reflected his economic belief
in the "trickle down" theory. As a result he was popular with the business community, especially after refunding over $2,000,000,000 to some
of the largest corporations in the United States, including several Mellon
companies.

Thus by 1932, although misreading the depression-he

believed it to be a temporary setback and urged liquidating labor, stocks,
farmers, and real estate-he was being hailed as the "greatest Secretary
of Treasury since Alexander Hamilton" and the only man "under whom
three Presidents served. m

Despite the reverence with which many viewed his accomplishments and record, Mellon had for a number of years been the subject
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of attack. In 1922 and 1923 several United States senators questioned
the propriety of his appointment, but their efforts proved futile. Again
in 1929, at the suggestion of Senator Kenneth McKellar of Tennessee,
the Senate Committee on Judiciary investigated the eligibility of Mellon
to hold office. The committee could not reach a consensus, even though
Senator George W. Norris of Nebraska and three colleagues wanted to
remove Mellon for what they considered malfeasance in office. A
majority of the members exonerated him, so Mellon remained head of
the Treasury, unscathed by congressional action. '0
In the meantime other issues also spurred opposition to Mellon.
During February, 1930, Norris criticized the monopoly of ALCOA
which was protected by a high tariff. At the same time Senator Thomas
J. Walsh of Montana led a movement to reduce import duties on aluminum products. Then, in November, Senator Smith W. Brookhart of
Iowa threatened to bolt the Republican Party and join the Democrats
unless Mellon and Treasury Undersecretary Ogden Mills were removed.
He was furious with them because they opposed farmer and labor relief
measures. Such prominent economists as former president of the
American Economic Association, John H. Gmy, joined in the outcry
charging that Mellon had been responsible for "continuing and extending the mania" of stock speculation and for the subsequent depression."
Patman was the most caustic of Mellon's critics. He was determined to remove Mellon from office for violating the laws of the United
States. In speech after speech from 1929 to 1932 he vehemently
denounced Mellon for a long list of alleged abuses. For too many
years Mellon had destroyed "equal opportunity" in the market place.
He also had "violated more laws ... [and had] illegally acquired more
property" than any other person "on earth without fear of punishment."

With President Hoover as his "hireling" he was able to force on the
country Han overdose of Mellonism"-"rnisery, misfortune, and mal-

feasance." Thus he had delivered the American people into the "clutches
of organized agreed." Because of his governmental power and influence
he protected Mellon companies from anti-trust laws. Consequently,
Patman often stated that converting "Clarence Darrow to the cause of
Christianity" would have been easier than enlightening "'Mr. Mellon to

the cause of the plain people.""
Mellon represented a philosophy of economic self-interest which
Patman abhorred. After World War I the Secretary of the Treasury
and 7,000 other men had profited because their companies had had
government contracts and had been generously compensated for losses
caused by the war. Even foreign countries who owed the United States
millions of dollars in reparations, loans, and debts, had received prefer-

ential treatment at "his hand;" yet he had no compassion for needy
Americans, charged Patman. From 1921 to 1932, when over 6,000
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bank failures occurred, Mellon did nothing because, Patman asserted,
Mellon banks were safe. Even worse, he created bUdget deficits so that
spending on public works would have to be cut. In addition, being an
ex-officio member of the Federal Reserve Board and at that time possibly the most influential member, he limited the amount of circulating
money, making dollars dear and interest rates high. Because of this
conservative policy he diminished spending power at a time of depression when buying and selling should have been increased.
Patman instinctively distrusted bankers. Therefore, he was especially leary of Mellon. Big, pOwerful bankers were, he was convinced,
unempathetic creatures who cared only about raising interest rates and
seeing debtors squirm. Oftentimes, he echoed the warnings of Thomas
Jefferson that if banks ever controlled the currency then "banks and
corporations ... [would] deprive the people of all property.""
The one issue which widened the chasm between Patman and
Mellon, however, was the "bonus bill" Or adjusted service compensation." Since 1929 Patman had led the fight to redeem these World
War I certificates immediately because veterans needed the money
during the depression, not in 1945 when they were due. He considered
this payment a legal debt owed by the government to veterans. Consequently, he presented bill after bill from 1929 to 1936 when it finally
became law."
During the Hoover Administration, Mellon was the chief adversary
to Patman and the "bonus." Since 1922 he led Republican opposition
against such payments. During the depression he seemed to prefer
aiding large corporations through billion-dollar tax refunds rather than
supporting war-time heroes. In 1931, while testifying before a Senate
Finance Committee, he admitted to paying off $3 billion of the national
debt prematurely, an act which eventually created a budget deficit. As
a result he was able to prevent "bonus" legislation because, Patman

contended, the money was no longer available. Mellon also claimed
that the $2 billion needed to fund the adjusted service certificates would
"hurt business by choking the bond market and the public debt operations." Ironically, he then requested congressional authority to float
$8 billion in bonds to retire the public debt but not the "bonus" debt.
Although many veterans needed funds because of the depression, he
defended his point by saying that the payments would only be "a temporary aid" and would not "constitute a real benefit" to anyone. If by
chance a hearing was held on the "'bonus," he sent Under Secretary
Mills, "his mouthpiece," as Patman called him, to present the opposing
arguments. So no matter where or when adjusted compensation was
discussed, "the invisible hand of MelIonism was present." If not writing
letters against aid to veterans, he was helping Hoover compose "bonus"
veto messages. He even had his "stooges" at American Legion conven-
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tions to prevent debate on the subject. Since such machinations were
typical of Mellon, Patman frequently recommended that with "Capone
out of the way, it would be a good idea to go after Andrew Mellon.""
Thus, the inevitable happened. "On my own responsibility," Patman announced to the House on January 6, 1932, "1 impeach Andrew
William Mellon, Secretary of the Treasury of the United States for
high crimes and misdemeanors." Without hesitating for a moment, he

charged that Mellon had violated parts of Section 343, Title 5 of the
United States Code of Laws. To protect the public against dishonesty
and unethical behavior in government, the Secretary of the Treasury
could not be interested either "directly or indirectly" in the business of
trade and commerce. Neither could he own any Sea vessel, purchase
public property, nor buy or sell securities. Moreover, he could not
receive any emolument for negotiating or transacting business in the
Treasury Department."
According to the evidence Patman presented, Mellon had violated
the entire COde-willfully, knowingly, and intentionally. While serving
in the Cabinet he and his family retained ownership of substantial voting
stock in over 300 corporations engaged in worldwide trade and commerce. Such businesses, induding railroads, utilities, banking, and
shipping, were protected by tariffs whose enforcement and supervision
were under the auspices of the Treasury Department. Personally interested in imports and exports, Mellon seemingly promulgated customs
regulations to his own business advantage; thus, he held the "dual
position," Patman asserted, "of serving two masters, himself and the

United States." For example, in spite of the specific provisions that
the Secretary should not own sea vessels, Mellon had acquired a fleet
of sixty-seven ships, all but forty-nine registered under foreign flags.
As ex-officio member of the Federal Reserve Board, he could not legally
be a director of or hold stock in a bank, but he did so. As supervisor
of internal revenue he was concerned with the assessment and collection
of taxes. Acting in that capacity, he secretly approved gigantic refunds
to large corporations, especially his own. Moreover, he exploited his
position as Secretary of Treasury by encouraging the Supervising Architect, a subordinate, to use more aluminum in public buildings and to

purchase it from the Aluminum Company of America (ALCOA), a
company which he controlled."
When Patman sat down, House members were stunned, as if having
just heard that some great man had died. But their silence lasted only
for a moment. The first to speak was Joseph W. Burns of Tennessee
who moved that Patman's resolution be sent to the Judiciary Committee.
Soon the chamber was filled with speculation. Although Patman had
for many months been threatening some sort of attack against Mellon,
several congressmen were surprised by his boldness, or some would
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say his foolhardiness, in actually seeking an impeachment. Some
expressed sympathy with the resolution but lamented that Patman had
doomed his own political career. Occasionally, someone spoke above
the hushed babble to condemn the proceeding or seek recognition from
the Speaker. Only the House pages, moving like "shadows," darted in
and out of the chamber to fetch reference and law books for members
who wished to brush up on proper impeachment procedures."
Outside the House the activity was confusing, the atmosphere
tense, the mood emotional. Reporters buttonholed everyone entering
or leaving the floor, seeking explanations, expressions of opinion, and
more details. Some of Mellon's Republican supporters angrily denounced Patman while others, tight-lipped and grim, rushed back to
their offices to plan a course of action that could be implemented to
counter Patman's charges. In the hallways, cloak rooms, and committee
rooms "Mellonites, poll parrots and 'yes' men," as Patman later characterized them, began organizing themselves into some sort of a "defense
machine. mo
Patman soon became the target of illegal actions, the object for
vituperative abuse, and ridicule. Besides his phones being tapped, his
offices were ransacked; Capitol police were ordered to patrol the hallways outside his office. And he received the full treatment from the
pro-Mellon press. Caricatures by cartoonists depicting him as foolish
and inept appeared daily. Editorials questioned why a congressman
wasted time on such insignificant issues. One article referred to his
impeachment proposal as "sorry business ... which Mellon-baiters ...
now joyfully promote." Othcr writers suggested that Congress and the
country needed a "personal scapegoat" to blame for the depression and
that Mellon was "the inevitable target." At the same time Republicans
and businessmen discredited Patman by praising the Secretary for ushering in the prosperous I 920s."
On January 13, 1932, the House Judiciary Committee began considering Patman's charges. Overall, the proceedings were orderly.
Meeting in the House Office Building, the twenty-three committee members convened at 10:00 a.m. Then acting chairman Hatton W. Sumners
of Texas explained that the hearing was a preliminary investigation to
determine if substantial evidence against Mellon existed. At the conclusion of the inquiry a detailed report, recommending either impeachment
or not, would be made to the House. From the beginning the members

came to the understanding that any typc of evidence could be presented
to substantiate or refute a charge. Consequently they allowed news
clippings, letters from prospective witnesses, and other data which could

in a formal House hearing be properly documented. Having precipitated this action, Patman sat on one side of the table facing several

representatives of Mellon, who would not attend. Alexander W. Gregg,
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former solicitor for the Internal Revenue Bureau, and D. D. Sheppard,
a Pittsburgh attorney, were the primary defenders for the Secretary."
For over a week the committee members listened to each side.

They constantly interrupted witnesses to ask a question or request
clarification. Although Patman and Gregg endured grilling, members
frequently expressed skepticism of the evidence and explanations offered
by Mellon's defense. On numerous occasions Fiorello La Guardia of
New York and Frank Oliver of New York were especially persistent
that Gregg not sidestep a question but answer as precisely and accurately
as possible."
Acting the role of prosecutor, Patman skillfully presented his case
against Mellon. From the beginning he assured the committee that he
had "no persecution involved" or "no personal reason" for seeking an
impeachment. "Just like President Hoover said, 'Law enforcement

should commence at the top,''' he continued, "and I think it should
apply to Mr. Mellon ... the same as anybody else." In his arguments,
he contended that any important stockholder would have a close personal interest in a business with total resources of over $2 billion. His
inquiry of several months into Mellon's financial investments revealed
that he held stock in corporations owning sea vessels; thus, he had a
share "in whole or in part" of these ships. In addition, as the supervisor
of the Coast Guard and the Customs Office, Mellon faced a conflict of
interest whenever formulating American regulations on imports and

exports. A similar condition existed with the Bureau of Internal Revenue, also under the Treasury Department. As Secretary, he had
refunded billions of dollars not only to corporations such as United
States Steel Corporation and ALCOA but also to himself at 6 percent
annual interest. Even more astonishing, he had carried out these federal
transactions unrestrained since public inspection was forbidden-no

system of checks and balances."
One of Patman's major arguments against Mellon was his interest
in ALCOA. Admittedly, Mellon owned substantial stock in this corporation. But what Mellon failed to reveal was that Richard B. Mellon,
his brother, was a close associate. These two men represented 100
percent control of the corporation, an inextricable business relationship
in which the same secretary, office, and telephone were shared. With

such close ties to ALCOA, Patman charged, Mellon must have been
interested in and must have voiced some opinion on its financial operations. Since the company was the largest American aluminum manu-

facturer-a monopoly protected by a high tariff-he had blatantly
violated anti-trust laws. Thus he used his government position to
further personal finances. This unethical behavior was especially evident
wheu he allowed the Federal Architect, a professional magazine which
carried articles urging the use of aluminum as well as advertisements
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praising ALCOA, to be pUblished in the Treasury Building."
Patman also pressed one other matter. He accused Mel10n of
using the Treasury Office to obtain oil property, known as the Barco
Concession. In June 1930, at a dinner hosted by Secretary of State
Henry L. Stimson, Mel10n had "bargained" with Colombian President
OJaya Herrera. At that time Mellon implied that if an oil deal could
be worked out OJaya's request for an American loan to sustain his
government would be fulfilled. In June 1931 OJaya granted a fifty-year
contract to the Colombia Petroleum Company, seventy-five percent of
which was owned by Gulf Oil Corporation, a Mel10n company. Subsequent to that transaction, Patman pointed out, the National City Bank
of New York extended a loan to the Colombian government."
In answer to Patman's charges, Attorney Gregg presented the
Mellon's defense. He contended that Mel10n did not have a controlling
interest in the companies in which he had stock; therefore, he could
work with the customs and the Coast Guard because he did not actual1y
own any sea vesseL Besides, Gregg asserted, previous secretaries had
held shares in businesses and had performed their duties without any
problems. At the time of appointment to the Treasury Mel10n had
resigned al1 his bank offices and had sold his bank stock. As for tax
refunds, he had personally received $91,000 and then had later paid
back an additional $209,000 for duplication of dividends. He did have
fifteen percent interest in ALCOA, but, according to Gregg, even when
the Mel10ns were considering a merger with a Canadian business, the
Secretary, although in the same private train car with both companies'
representatives, remained disinterested, looked out the window, and
never entered into the conversation. To refute Patman's charges on
the Barco matter, Gregg stated that OJaya had since retracted his
previous statement that Mellon had used coercion or made a "deal"
with him during the dinner in June 1930."
On January 19, 1932, after a week of testimony and argument,
the committee recessed in order to obtain more information, especially
a list of bank stock from Mellon and from the Treasury Department.
Then a series of unforeseen events occurred which dramatically affected
the impeachment. On February 3 Ambassador to Great Britain Charles
G. Dawes resigned in order to head the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. With this foreign assignment now vacant, Hoover quickly
coerced his "wisest and most experienced public servant"-Andrew
Mel1on-to accept the Ambassadorship two days later."
Suddenly, the subject of the impeachment was no longer Secretary
of the Treasury. On February 10 the House Judiciary Committee
members reconvened to take some action, but they did not arrive at
a decision easily. Behind closed doors, in a "heated two hour executive
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session," they dehated whether or not to drop the inquiry. At times the
loud discussions reverberated down the hallways. Eventually the members agreed "to discontinue further consideration of allegations" by a
vote of seventeen to four. According to Chairman Sumners, this resolution was the only alternative since the original intent of the hearing
constituted "an ouster proceeding." Moreover, the basic premise of the
majority report viewed further investigations as useless since the accused

party had resigned as Treasury Secretary."
The four dissenting members submitted a minority report. In carefully worded language, they concurred with the majority "that no useful
purpose would be served by continuing the investigation." They
stressed, however, that their action was based "on that reaSOn alone.
"The law in question," they continued, at this point was "no longer
applicable to the office now held by Mr. Mellon." Thus, they subtly
underlined that Mellon had not been exonerated by the committee, more
pointedly, the accusations that he had violated the law had not been
satisfactorily answered by the defense. '"
H

That same day while the House Judiciary Committee was debating
its resolution, the Senate confirmed Ogden Mills as the new Secretary
of the Treasury. Three days later Sumner, with the grim-faced Patman
silently sitting beside him, presented the majority report to the House.
Surprisingly the chamber was almost empty; the mood surely languid.
Unenthusiatically the congressmen accepted the recommendation of the
Judiciary Committee, and in a few minutes the impeachment attempt
ended. "
Mellon's sudden appointment as ambassador left Patman with
mixed emotions. If the impeachment proceedings had been carried to
the logical conclusion he had hoped to see the Secretary convictcd and
removed from public office forever. In fact, he accused Hoover of
granting a "presidential pardon," an artifice to save the President, the
Secretary of the Treasury, and the Republican Party. He was personally
convinced that his actions had ousted Mellon from one of the most
powerful positions in the country. After all, if no impcachment had
been pending in the House, Hoover would probably have been more
hesitant and cautious about removing Mellon, a respected leader of

conservative Republicanism, from the Cabinet and sending him off to
socialize at the Court of SI. James. Now Patman had more hope that
Americans would receive needcd depression relief, although Mellon's
first assistant, Mills, was now Secretary. Thus, while Mellon considered
his appointment as ambassador "a divorce" from the government,
Patman looked upon the attempted impeachment as a victory.lZ

By the end of February the Mellon investigation was fading from
notice. Although the public had not heard all the facts, Patman could

EAST TEXAS HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION

43

not dwell on the issue indefinitely. Other matters required his attention
-veterans' legislation, farm aid, and depression relief. Then, too, he
would be campaigning in 1932 for re-election and for Democratic presidential nominee, Governor Franklin Delano Roosevelt of New Yark.
The attempted impeachment and subsequent removal of Mellon
signified the end of an era. In 1932 the election of Roosevelt reflected
an evolution of attitude-laissez-faire and socialized control (essentially
Hoover's "American System") being replaced by governmental responsibility. Even though the impeachment did not precipitate this philosophical transformation, this affair, centering on two opposites-Mellon
and Patman-was a signal of the changing times. The conservative
political and economic policies which had held sway since 1921 were
now obsolete. And the innovative programs, known as the "New Deal,"
marked the emergence of a new age, the impact of which has continued
to the present.
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